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Fairness on the Day After Tomorrow: Justice, 
Reciprocity and Global Climate Change  
 
 
Climate change raises important questions of global distributive 
justice, which can be defined as the issue of how benefits and burdens 
should be distributed within and between generations. This article 
addresses two conceptual issues that underpin the relationship 
between climate change and the part of distributive justice concerned 
with the entitlements of future persons. The first is the role of 
reciprocity, conceived either as mutual advantage or fair play, in the 
allocation of distributive entitlements between generations. The 
second is the extent to which theories of ‘justice as reciprocity’ can 
ground duties of intergenerational justice that underpin radical 
policies to manage the causes and impacts of global climate change. I 
argue that theories of justice as fair reciprocity generate significant 
duties of environmental conservation, despite these duties not being 
owed directly to the not-yet-born. 
 
 
Global climate change, understood as an ongoing and complex pattern of changes 
in the composition of the earth’s atmosphere arising from human activity or 
natural variability, has attracted enormous interest amongst natural and social-
scientists in recent years. While it has been long understood that numerous natural 
transformations of the Earth’s atmosphere have occurred over its history, a strong 
consensus has only recently emerged that human behaviour can affect the 
atmosphere in ways that will have significant impacts on future generations.1 A 
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number of impact analyses have indicated that the climate changes involved will 
be generally, if not uniformly, adverse for future populations (McMichael and 
Githeko, 2001; Tol, 2002; Schellnhuber et al, 2006, pp. 133-202). Climate change 
is, in addition, consistently reported as one of the most pressing problems facing 
the world in surveys of elite and public opinion, even if there remains 
considerable disagreement as to the appropriate response to the problem (Page, 
2006, pp. 7ff).  
While climate change raises a number of important issues for political scientists 
and theorists, a key set of questions concerns the interface between climate 
change and the emerging field of global distributive justice, understood as the 
issue of how benefits and burdens should be distributed within and between 
generations. A host of intergovernmental reports and philosophical analyses have 
argued that climate policies must be consistent with international and 
intergenerational justice in order for them to secure the legitimacy needed to be 
effective in meeting their aims and objectives.2 In particular, there has arisen a 
broad consensus around the objective, first outlined in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), that a global solution to 
climate change must as a matter of justice prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system’ (United Nations, 1995, p. 5; Adger et al, 
2006, Paavola and Adger, 2006).   
While there have been a number of attempts in recent years to construct theories 
of justice that explain our environmental duties to future generations, there have 
been few systematic evaluations of the objectives laid out in the UNFCCC, or the 
normative assumptions that lie behind these objectives. In this article, I will be 
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investigating one set of reasons for thinking that the philosophical basis of our 
obligations to members of future generations, for example to tackle the origins 
and impacts of climate change, is more complex than is often assumed. The 
discussion will focus on the challenge to intergenerational justice that arises from 
giving foundational value to the notion of reciprocity, considered either as mutual 
advantage or fair play.  
Duties of reciprocity have tended to be overlooked in the literature on 
intergenerational justice in favour of more fashionable theories of distribution 
such as contractualism (Kumar, 2003, pp. 105ff), communitarianism (De Shalit, 
1995, pp. 13ff), and impersonal consequentialism (Broome, 1992, pp. 27ff). Yet, 
there is a significant ethic of reciprocity running through many historical and 
contemporary discussions of our duties to posterity which has not been fully 
explored and which, more importantly, seems immune to some of the difficulties 
that plague rival approaches. Theories of justice as reciprocity are not obviously 
prone to the problem of extending contractual methodologies to explore the 
claims of individuals whose existence will be contingent on the rules being 
explored by the contract device; they do not reduce intergenerational justice to a 
matter only of preserving the values of one’s community; and they do not imply 
perpetual pressure to increase the population in order to maximise total welfare.      
In what follows, I provide an overview of two influential ‘reciprocity-based’ 
accounts of distributive justice. I then show that neither account, without 
modification, can be extended beyond the context of the present generation. I then 
go on to explore how reciprocity-based theories that invoke the idea of reciprocity 
as fair play, rather than mutual advantage, can be modified so that they generate 
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significant duties of intergenerational conservation, despite these duties not being 
owed directly to the not-yet-born. I argue that such modifications provide a useful 
addition to the range of ethical approaches that converge on a global and tough 
approach to the origins and effects of climate change.  
 
RECIPROCITY-BASED JUSTICE 
The key feature of theories of distributive justice as reciprocity is the assumption 
that only individuals who contribute to the well-being of others are entitled to a 
full and fair share of society’s resources.3 We might call this the ‘contribution 
requirement.’ The contribution requirement can be used to specify both the 
‘scope’ and the ‘content’ of distributive justice. That is, it can be used to 
determine which entities possess entitlements to social benefits; which entities are 
bound by duties to provide these benefits; and the size of the share that each 
person is entitled to in terms of some currency of justice. The essence of the 
contribution requirement is that a person’s non-strategic capabilities, such as their 
needs or interests, do not in themselves generate valid claims to social resources. 
While there are many ways in which the contribution requirement might operate 
within a theory of distributive justice, two main theories of justice as reciprocity 
have emerged in the literature. The first proposes that requirements of justice are 
determined by considerations of self-interest; the second proposes that these 
requirements are determined by considerations of fairness (or fair play) 
According to ‘Justice as Self-Interested Reciprocity’, requirements of justice must 
be consistent with the pursuit of advantage of the individuals who are bound by 
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them. The idea is that entitlements to social benefits are distributed in strict 
proportion to people’s contributions or their bargaining position relative to others 
(these two formulations can diverge, but I put this possibility aside). One example 
of justice as self-interested reciprocity is found in the writings of David Gauthier. 
In Morals by Agreement, Gauthier argued that norms of distributive justice are 
generated as ‘a rational constraint from the non-moral premises of rational choice’ 
(Gauthier, 1986, p. 4). The idea is that norms of justice are defensible only insofar 
as they can be shown to be rational, and they are rational only if they are in the 
interests of the individuals they bind, where the prime motivation of all 
individuals is assumed to be the pursuit of their own advantage. As ‘constrained 
utility maximisers’, Gauthier argued, rational individuals will cooperate with 
others who are similarly disposed by respecting certain norms of justice so long as 
(1) it is in their own interest and (2) the selection of these norms is the outcome of 
a bargaining situation that reflects the differential resources of the participants. So 
long as these two conditions are satisfied, the logic of self-interested reciprocity 
can be relied upon generate constraints on human behaviour ‘as the minimum 
price that has to be paid in order to obtain the co-operation of others’ (Barry, 
1989, p. 6).  
According to the second way of linking justice and reciprocity, ‘Justice as Fair 
Reciprocity’, it is a particular notion of fairness, and not merely prudence, which 
lies at the heart of our obligations to others. Adopting the idea that behaving 
unfairly is unjust regardless of its prudential value enables proponents of this 
approach to sidestep the powerful criticism of self-interested reciprocity that it has 
no way of explaining why schemes of social cooperation that exclude the 
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impoverished from social benefits are unjust (Barry, 1995, pp. 33ff). Gauthier, for 
example, makes it clear that only those who are already capable of fruitful co-
operation, and who belong to an already existing framework, can be recognised as 
possessing claims of justice (Gauthier, 1986, pp. 283-7). Justice as fair 
reciprocity, by contrast, since it allocates intrinsic moral value to dealings of fair 
play, will outlaw extreme forms of exclusion on the grounds that they are an 
affront to the notion of fairness (Smith, 2003, p. 245; White, 2003, pp. 49ff).  
The essence of justice as fair reciprocity was captured by John Rawls, who 
claimed that members of just societies ‘are not to gain from the co-operative 
labours of others without doing [their] fair share’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 112). Similarly, 
Stuart White argues that ‘if one willingly enjoys the fruits of one’s fellow 
citizens’ labours, then, as a matter of justice, one ought to provide some 
appropriate good or service in return’ (White, 2003, p. 49). Yet, a serious 
complication with such declarations of fair reciprocity is that notions of ‘doing 
our fair share’ and of ‘providing some appropriate good for others’ are wide open 
to interpretation (Arneson, 1997, pp. 339ff; Smith, 2001, pp. 32ff; Becker, 2005). 
As Becker notes, subtly different conceptions of fair reciprocity operate in a wide 
range of social contexts, each attempting ‘to turn the general concept [of fair 
reciprocity] into a more determinate set of norms and standards’ (Becker, 2005, 
p.18)    
According to one popular conception of fair reciprocity, ‘doing one’s fair share’ 
involves the exchange of benefits of equal size. We might call this ‘benefit 
reciprocity.’ Benefit reciprocity is an important category of fair-reciprocity, but 
not exhaustive of it. Some theorists have proposed that equivalent sacrifices, in 
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contrast to equivalent benefits, are the key to fair reciprocity. The idea is that the 
costs of performing some reciprocal duties are much higher for some than the 
costs of performing the actions that ground these duties, so it would be unfair to 
require equivalent exchanges in these cases (White, 2003, pp. 66ff; Becker, 2005, 
p.27). Suppose that developing countries had contributed as much to the origins of 
climate change as developed countries. It would still not seem fair to expect these 
countries to bear the same absolute burden to mitigate or adapt to the problem as 
richer countries since they have far less capacity. Rather, it would be appropriate 
only to require a contribution from the developed world, considered either in 
collective or non-collective terms, that reflects its capacity. Yet, a contribution 
would still have to be made, on this view, since fair reciprocity obtains only when 
all parties contribute something to the costs of a collaborative activity. The notion 
of ‘cost reciprocity’, as we might call it, is an integral element of the UNFCCC, 
which states that ‘The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equality and in 
accordance with their respective responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(United Nations, 1995, p. 5). 
Both benefit and cost reciprocity are most usefully applied in the context of face-
to-face transactions between individuals that are uncoerced. However, they are 
more difficult to apply on other contexts. It is unclear, for example, how we might 
allocate the duties of fair play amongst those who interact through complex causal 
pathways, such as global financial markets or as users of the Earth’s atmosphere. 
A third articulation of fair reciprocity is more applicable to such cases because it 
assumes that reciprocal duties can be discharged by providing benefits for a 
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‘substitute’ where the recipient of the debt specifies this as being preferable or 
where a lack of direct contact renders impossible an equivalent exchange of 
benefits (or costs). We might call this ‘indirect reciprocity.’ Perhaps the most 
interesting, and diffused, form of indirect reciprocity concerns the disposition to 
respect norms of fairness or dealings with social institutions that provide benefits 
to all (Arneson, 1997, p. 340).  
Although justice as fair reciprocity has been criticised for neglecting the ethical 
importance of ‘non-strategic’ features of persons such as their humanity or 
vulnerability (Goodin, 1985, pp. 177ff; Buchanan, 1990, pp. 231ff; Barry 1995, pp. 
33ff), notions of contributiveness and fair reciprocity describe an important aspect 
of distributive justice. As White observes, there is a ‘strong contribution ethic’, 
modelled on fairness rather than self-interest, evident in the liberal egalitarian 
tradition that currently dominates Anglo-American political philosophy (White, 
2003, pp. 5ff). The notion of reciprocity is, for example, a central component in 
the literature on Unconditional Basic Income, both in terms of the problem of 
determining the scope of the basic income, as well as the level at which it should 
be set (Galston, 2001, pp. 29-33; White, 1997, pp. 318ff). It has also been 
invoked, often implicitly, in recent approaches to global poverty that restrict some 
duties to those that are members of a shared ‘system of cooperation’ (Pogge, 
2002, pp. 198-201; Caney, 2005, pp. 102-116). Charles Beitz, for example, 
invokes fair reciprocity when he claims that ‘the requirements of justice apply to 
institutions and practices (whether or not they are genuinely cooperative) in which 
social activity produces relative or absolute benefits or burdens that not would 
exist if the social activity did not take place’ (Beitz, 1999, p. 131).  
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The concept of fair reciprocity is, moreover, frequently invoked in discussions of 
climate change by policy-makers, negotiators and activists. A notable example is 
the exchange between the group of countries, led by the US, which is sceptical of 
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, and the group of fast industrialising 
countries, led by India, that support the Protocol. As well as criticising the 
Protocol for being a threat to US economic interests, the Bush administration’s 
position has been that the current climate architecture is unjust since it exempts 
developing countries from any binding emissions reductions. US involvement in 
any future climate architecture, by contrast, has been made conditional on the 
‘meaningful participation’ of developing countries such as India and China.  
The principle of ‘meaningful participation’ was outlined by George W. Bush at 
the EU summit in Gothenburg in June 2001 and continues to play a crucial part in 
the Bush administration’s alternative to Kyoto. This focuses on voluntary 
mechanisms that provide incentives to help lower the ‘carbon efficiency’ of 
participating states as defined by the ratio of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to 
overall economic activity. At the launch of this initiative in 2002, Bush called for 
immediate action on the part of developing countries stating that ‘it is 
irresponsible to absolve them from shouldering some of the shared obligations.’4 
For their part, India and other developing countries have accused the US of 
reneging on a duty of fairness to contribute to the costs of climate change in the 
light of being a huge beneficiary of the practices that brought it about. They also 
emphasize the unfairness of setting countries reductions targets when their 
emissions amount to a fraction of those of the developed countries in per capita 
terms, and when such reductions could not be afforded without great sacrifice.5
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While the Bush administration’s approach to Kyoto is viewed by many as itself a 
scandalous violation of fair reciprocity (Singer, 2002, pp. 38ff; Athanasiou and 
Baer, 2002, pp. 115ff), it seems clear that an effective, global climate agreement 
will not emerge until the issue of fairness in the distribution of the costs of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation is resolved. Notions of fair reciprocity may be 
dismissed by many philosophers as outmoded, but all the indications are that they 
will play a vital role in this debate.     
 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NON-RECIPROCITY PROBLEM 
There is now compelling evidence that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere since the beginning of the industrial revolution is starting to have 
a range of impacts on the quality of human life, and will continue to do so for 
many centuries. Evidence collected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change  (IPCC) shows that there is no longer any reasonable doubt that the 0.6OC 
global warming witnessed in the last 100 years was caused by anthropogenic 
greenhouse emissions (Houghton et al., 2001, pp. 10ff). Nor is there any reason to 
believe that the composition of the atmosphere will stop changing in ways that 
affect human life as greenhouse gases continue their projected rise over the next 
century (Schneider and Sarukhan, 2001, pp. 77ff). 
As is well known, the IPCC’s assessments have informed international 
negotiations on adopting a coherent and binding regime of climate change in 
terms of mitigation (the prevention of avoidable climate change) and adaptation 
(the modifying of human practices to accommodate unavoidable climate change). 
The most prominent output of these negotiations has been the Kyoto Protocol, 
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which came into force on 16 February 2005, and which requires developed 
countries to reduce their collective greenhouse emissions by an average of 5.2% 
from their 1990 levels by the end of 2012. Enthusiasts of the Protocol claim that it 
will save significant numbers of future persons from adverse environmental 
impacts while only imposing modest sacrifices on their predecessors (Singer, 
2002, pp. 22ff; Athanasiou and Baer, 2002, pp. 98ff). They also maintain that 
problems pertaining to compliance with the terms of the Protocol, as well as the 
refusal of the US to ratify it, should be viewed within the context of Kyoto being a 
‘prototype regime’ that will be replaced at a later date by a more comprehensive 
global agreement (DeSombre, 2004, pp. 41-46). In fact, there now exists over 40 
proposed climate architectures that build on the basic elements of Kyoto in order 
to manage climate change beyond 2012 (Bodansky, 2004, pp. 19-58).  
Sceptics of Kyoto, by contrast, hold that the Protocol is hopelessly flawed. They 
claim, for example, that the science that underlies the Protocol paints an overly 
pessimistic picture of climate change and its likely impact on human well-being 
(Lomborg, 2001, pp. 258ff); that the Protocol will do little to prevent dangerous 
climate change in its present form (Gardiner, 2004, pp. 23-39; Nordhaus, 2001); 
and that the socio-economic costs of Kyoto will far outweigh its modest benefits 
in terms of human well-being in the longer-term (Lomborg, 2001, pp. 302ff; 
Cline, 2004, pp. 23ff).  
Recent research into long-term climate change suggests that the sceptics 
underestimate the likely costs of unmitigated climate change. Several IPCC 
authors, for example, have warned that a range of catastrophic impacts will occur 
if atmospheric concentrations of CO2 exceed 500 parts per million later this 
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century, as is certain to be the case if global emissions remain at their present 
levels (Paavola and Adger, 2006; Schneider and Lane, 2006).6 The Stern Review 
on the Economics of Climate Change added that, if unchecked, rising greenhouse 
gas concentrations could lead to a reduction in global per-capita consumption of 
between 5 and 20 per cent by the end of the next century (Stern, 2007, Chapter 6). 
Yet, the empirical claims of the sceptics are not the only source of doubt about the 
coherence of the UNFCCC’s objective to avoid ‘dangerous climate change’ in the 
name of justice. A more intrinsically ethical problem is that combating climate 
change for the sake of future generations will involve huge unrequitable sacrifices 
on the part of the present generation, and in particular the present poor, in a way 
that seems irreconcilable with any version of justice as reciprocity.  
Suppose the Protocol, and any successor agreement, achieves the full compliance 
of ratifying Parties over the next 200 years. The vast majority of future 
individuals that will benefit from the modest amount of climate change avoided 
will never be in a position to repay the present generation for their sacrifice, either 
individually or collectively, since virtually all existing persons will be long dead 
before the real benefits of Kyoto and successor regimes have materialised. 
Reciprocity-based justice requires, by contrast, that persons provide benefits for 
others, including members of different nations or generations, only if the 
recipients are in a position to reciprocate. Persons belonging to later generations, 
however, can do little either to enhance or diminish the well-being of members of 
earlier generations.7 It would not seem just, on grounds of prudence or fairness, 
for earlier generations to sacrifice their well-being for the sake of their successors 
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who they will never meet and who cannot contribute to their well-being. We 
might call this the ‘non-reciprocity problem.’ 
The non-reciprocity problem reflects the fact that dealings between non-
contemporaries are characterised by a peculiarly intractable co-ordination 
problem. Here, reciprocal behaviour cannot apparently emerge in order to solve 
‘global commons’ problems that turn on the equitable distribution of rights to, and 
usage of, global public goods such as a hospitable climate system. Unlike 
contemporaneous members of different countries, the parties cannot interact and 
cooperate for conceptual, rather than contingent, reasons (Barry, 1989, p. 189; 
Gardiner, 2004, pp. 29ff). Members of earlier generations seem, in this sense, to 
be in a similar situation to those living in an upstream community who have 
realised that their industrial and agricultural practices are polluting the 
environment of communities living downstream at no cost to themselves. If 
reciprocity determines the scope and content of justice, future persons have no 
claims against their ancestors. 
The non-reciprocity problem arises for those who are tempted to hold the 
following four beliefs: 
(1) the performance of acts, or adoption of social policies, which 
threaten the well-being of members of future generations violates 
certain requirements of justice.  
(2) requirements of justice are owed only to those who can reciprocate 
with those who are bound by those requirements. 
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(3) reciprocity exists only between persons who can interact with each 
other through some direct causal pathway. 
(4) it is not possible to affect the interests of those who belong to past 
generations.  
It seems that proponents of justice as reciprocity have three options when tempted 
by these incompatible beliefs.  First, they could abandon the thought that justice 
can be extended in time beyond the nearest of generations (belief 1). Second, they 
could abandon their commitment to some aspect of justice as reciprocity (beliefs 2 
and 3). Third, they could abandon the view that persons are invulnerable to the 
actions of their distant successors (belief 4). The problem is that beliefs (2) and 
(3) seem indispensable for reciprocity theorists; belief (1) has widespread intuitive 
support; and belief (4) seems unavoidable on any plausible account of human 
well-being. It seems that, if the notion of intergenerational justice is to be 
defended, justice as reciprocity must be abandoned; or if justice as reciprocity is 
to be defended then clear norms of intergenerational justice must be abandoned. 
 
SOLVING THE NON-RECIPROCITY PROBLEM: 
INTERGENERATIONAL STEWARDSHIP 
Can proponents of justice as reciprocity respond to the non-reciprocity problem in 
a way that will contribute to the growing consensus that environmental problems 
that threaten the well-being of our descendants are unjust? Although the non-
reciprocity problem adeptly exploits the counter-intuitive restrictiveness of self 
interested reciprocity, there are a number of ways in which proponents of justice 
as fair reciprocity might finesse the problem. For reasons of space, I concentrate 
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here on the possibility of revising belief (3) in order to retain beliefs (1), (2), and 
(4) by developing the notion of indirect reciprocity. To recap, indirect reciprocity 
holds when a person or institution, A, discharges a duty to another person or 
institution, C, by benefiting a third person or institution, B, according to what can 
reasonably be expected to be C’s bidding. In more concrete terms, the approach to 
the non-reciprocity problem I propose is that we modify the mechanism of 
interaction at the heart of justice as fair reciprocity so that (3) becomes:   
(3A) reciprocity exists only between those persons who can interact 
with each other through some direct or indirect causal pathway. 
Perhaps the most promising account of intergenerational justice that appeals to  
(3A) is founded on the notion of ‘intergenerational stewardship.’ The idea is that 
existing persons are bound by duties of indirect reciprocity to protect 
environmental and human resources for posterity in return for the benefits 
inherited from their ancestors. Each generation does not possess unlimited rights 
over the natural and human environment, but is free to make use of the world’s 
resources so long as it does not degrade or destroy the inheritance of later 
generations. This does not, however, prevent a generation working to improve the 
quality of the resource base bequeathed to their successors by saving or through 
scientific and cultural achievements, or exempt those generations who have not 
received a fair inheritance from certain duties of conservation.  
Intergenerational stewardship can be usefully contrasted with the ‘communitarian’ 
defence of intergenerational justice. Here, members of political communities have 
a general duty to preserve the material and non-material conditions necessary for 
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the survival and flourishing of their community, which is viewed as an essential 
component of their sense of self (De Shalit, 1995, pp. 13-65; Marshall, 1993, pp. 
105ff). Although communitarianism and stewardship have occasionally been 
combined in the literature, notably in the writings of Edmund Burke (Burke, 1968, 
pp. 120ff), they are in many ways incompatible approaches. One contrast is that 
communitarianism is usually presented in future-orientated terms in the sense that 
it recognises no obligation to reciprocate, or continue, the efforts of prior 
generations. Rather, as de Shalit has put it, ‘our obligations to future generations 
derive from the sense of a community that stretches and extends over generations 
and into the future’ (De Shalit, 1995 p. 14). Here, it is the survival of the 
community that matters, and this turns in most cases not on the preservation of 
goods inherited from our ancestors, but on the values that present and future 
people could be imagined to share.  
Another contrast relates to substantive differences in how the views approach 
environmental problems. Since the stewardship model specifies the bearers and 
holders of duties of justice in terms of the language of reciprocal benefit, rather 
than of communal identity, it is potentially more inclusive than communitarian 
rivals as co-operative interaction regularly takes place across national borders. 
The result is that notions of stewardship are better placed to address ‘trans-
boundary’ problems, such as global climate change, which involve the ethical 
claims of non-compatriots as well as non-contemporaries. Communitarianism, by 
contrast, could justify a myopic response to climate change since members of the 
key polluting countries do not belong to the same communities, or share the same 
climate vulnerabilities as members of developing countries. According to the 
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stewardship approach, by contrast, present persons and institutions must, to the 
extent that they are able, pass on the benefit of a hospitable climate system to 
future persons wherever they live and whatever values they hold.  
While key elements of intergenerational stewardship have been defended by a 
number of distinguished political theorists,8 the clearest exposition of it as a 
development of fair reciprocity has been proposed by Lawrence Becker (Becker, 
1986, pp. 229-51). Becker’s argument runs as follows. A large proportion of the 
benefits that people receive in their lives is produced by persons with whom they 
have no face-to-face, or direct, exchanges. In such cases, the identities of the 
producers of these benefits might be known, yet it might be impossible for the 
recipients to return these benefits as (i) nothing can be produced which the 
original producers might value or (ii) nothing could be made which could 
subsequently be transferred to their possession. This does not mean, however, that 
there is no obligation to reciprocate for such benefits since an obligation of 
reciprocity may remain in place even in situations where a mutual exchange of 
benefits is impossible. To determine whether one has a duty to reciprocate, one 
must ask whether one has been in receipt of a good ‘for which some sort of fitting 
and proportional return is possible, and it is often perfectly fitting to make our 
returns to people other than those who have benefited us’ (Becker, 1986, pp. 230-
231; Becker, 2005, pp.24ff). Since our ancestors were responsible for creating 
many of the benefits that we currently enjoy, Becker adds that duties of fair 
reciprocity are also owed in a range of circumstances to those no longer alive; and 
a subset of such duties can only be discharged by producing appropriate benefits 
for the sake of members of future generations.  
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There are four main steps in Becker’s defence of duties of intergenerational 
stewardship (while Becker focuses on duties to reciprocate for the benefits 
conferred by past institutions, I assume that the account can be extended to cover 
the duties owed to past individuals from whom we have benefited). 
(1) many of the benefits enjoyed by present persons were produced by 
past persons with the intention that they be preserved indefinitely or 
for a specified amount of time. 
(2) although the intended recipients of these benefits are not always 
specified, these benefits are nonetheless intended for someone. 
(3) the obligation to pass on these benefits to future persons is 
analogous to the obligation to reciprocate for benefits received from 
unknown contemporaries.  
(4) it is ‘fitting and proportionate’ that existing persons pass on these 
benefits to our successors in order to ‘satisfy the moral requirements 
of reciprocity’ (Becker, 1986, p. 231). 
So the ‘fitting and proportionate return’ in Becker’s argument is owed to past 
persons, the obligation binds present persons, and the performance associated 
with this obligation is directed towards future persons.  
The stewardship approach, as presented by Becker, offers some important insights 
about relations between generations. Because it fuses elements of benefit, cost and 
indirect reciprocity, the approach does not require later generations to pass on 
goods they have inherited if they could only satisfy their basic needs by 
consuming them. The cost of providing an equivalent benefit in such cases would 
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be prohibitive and would violate the ideal of ‘balanced exchange’ according to 
which equivalent exchanges of benefits are desirable but must also be weighed 
against other considerations, such as differential capabilities. Becker stops short 
of endorsing cost reciprocity, however, since the effort required to produce a 
given benefit is given no independent value of its own. The upshot is that the 
benefits to be secured for future generations are determined primarily by the 
actual bundle of goods inherited, rather than the overall capacity of each 
generation to provide benefits for the sake of their successors.  
The weaknesses of Becker’s argument are revealed by an analysis of premises (1) 
and (4) of the argument. Suppose we grant that certain duties can be discharged 
only if we perform actions that benefit someone other than the owed party, as well 
as the claim that some duties are owed to past persons and can only be discharged 
by benefiting future persons. Premise (1) is vulnerable since the vast majority of 
benefits passed down through the generations were not explicitly bequeathed on 
the understanding that they be preserved for the sake of remote future generations. 
Premise (4), by contrast, assumes precisely that it is fitting and proportionate that 
such goods be saved, rather than consumed, by present persons even though we 
had no choice but to accept them, and this might seem hard to believe. 
The claim that benefits arising as unintended side-effects of other actions give rise 
to duties of fair requital on the part of their recipients is highly controversial. 
Suppose, for example, that a government adopts an initiative to reduce CO2 
emissions solely for the benefits this will have for the well-being of existing 
citizens. A century later it is demonstrated that this prior initiative also led to a 
reduction, for reasons that are poorly understood, in the incidence of certain 
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varieties of cancer. We would not usually suppose that those belonging to later 
generations owe any debt of gratitude to their predecessors for this unintentionally 
produced benefit. It just seems a matter of good fortune. Becker, however, argues 
that the receipt of unintentionally produced goods gives rise to a range of duties of 
reciprocity on the part of those that receive them, in particular to sustain and 
preserve the institutions or practices which enabled their production. ‘We owe to 
the future’, he argues, ‘only as much as we were given, and we must make our 
‘returns’ in the very way we were benefited (e.g. intentionally or unintentionally), 
and to the very institutions that benefited us’ (Becker, 1986, pp. 238-9).  
Aside from the conceptual problems associated with this imaginative broadening 
of fair reciprocity, there also arise some potentially disturbing consequences that 
must be evaluated. For, if we accepted that unintentionally produced benefits gave 
rise to the same range of duties as intentionally produced benefits, it would seem 
that we would be in danger of being swamped by duties of reciprocation. Should 
the present inhabitants of the UK feel obliged to the Romans, for example, for 
their unwitting role in the development of the country’s present road network? 
How might such an obligation be discharged? Are the present inhabitants of 
developed countries in debt to their ancestors for goods and services (such as 
cheap air travel and the internet) which would not have been invented had it not 
been for the industrial revolution?  
I say no more about the problem of unintentionally produced benefits because it 
seems clear that at least some of the benefits created for present persons were 
intentionally produced. Indeed, since the late 1980s, individuals, non-
governmental organisations and governments have fought hard for global 
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agreements on greenhouse gas reductions for the sake of future generations, so it 
is clear that acts and policies designed to protect the well-being of our successors 
need not be unplanned. Turning to the issue of ‘involuntary receipt’, the 
conceptual difficulties for Becker’s stewardship approach are less tractable. The 
key question, here, is the following: do those who benefit from the co-operative 
activities of others owe duties of fairness to those that produced the benefits in 
question?  
In an influential discussion of fairness and political obligation which has clear 
relevance for broader discussions of distributive justice, John Rawls argued that 
there were two key conditions for an affirmative answer: (i) that the benefit 
providing institution is just and (ii) that the benefits concerned are voluntarily 
accepted.9 Let us put Rawls’ first condition to one side on the grounds that it 
introduces unnecessary complications. If fair reciprocity concerns the making of 
fitting and proportionate returns for benefits that one receives from participating 
in voluntary social activities, the fact that one did not willingly co-operate in the 
production of certain goods would have two implications. First, one is bound by 
no duty to contribute to the production costs of the benefits received; second, one 
has no right to the benefits in the first place.  
While the voluntarist conception of fairness has some intuitive appeal, some 
theorists have suggested that benefits that have not been accepted voluntarily can 
give rise to obligations of requital in special circumstances (Arneson, 1982, pp. 
632ff; Becker, 1986, pp.361ff; Klosko, 1987, pp. 353ff). These circumstances 
may extend to the provision of excludable goods, such as income or property, but 
arise in particular when the benefits concerned are connected with the 
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preservation of goods that cannot be enjoyed by some without being enjoyed by 
all. The idea is that at least some of these public goods generate duties of fair 
reciprocity on their beneficiaries to contribute to the costs of their production even 
though they cannot be received voluntarily.  
The public goods that most plausibly force a suspension of the voluntary receipt 
condition are those that can be viewed as indispensable for a life of decent quality, 
such as national defence, law and order, or a habitable biosphere. Such goods, as 
Klosko has put it, are ‘presumptively beneficial’ in the sense that they provide 
benefits which ‘all members of the community want, whatever else they want, 
regardless of what their rational plans are in detail’ (Klosko, 1992, p. 39). It is this 
element of indispensability that obligates everyone to cooperate in providing 
presumptively beneficial public goods, for it can be assumed that any reasonable 
person ‘would pursue them (and bear their associated costs) if this were necessary 
for their receipt’ (Klosko, 1992, p. 43). 
The indispensable benefit provided by an atmosphere that is hospitable to human 
life constitutes a particularly apt example for defenders of non-voluntarist 
approaches to fair reciprocity and intergenerational justice. Although 
concentrations of greenhouse gases have been rising as a result of human activity 
since 1760, members of the present generation have been bequeathed an 
atmospheric system largely devoid of dangerous impacts. Few scientists believe 
that the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 witnessed before 1980, if stabilised, 
would bring about dangerous climate change despite the wide range of figures 
offered for the threshold at which concentrations of CO2 become ‘dangerous’ for 
human life. This suggests that present members of developed countries not only 
  
 23
 
have reason to value the benefits provided by a hospitable climate system, but 
also that the benefits they currently derive from an environment devoid of 
dangerous climate change far outweigh the sacrifices they are currently being 
asked to make to support the current global climate regime.  
Of course, if too little is done to mitigate climate change over the next century, 
remote future generations may find themselves in a position where they are 
unencumbered by duties of intergenerational reciprocity. This is because there can 
be no duty of fair reciprocity to pass on what one has not received. Yet, the task at 
hand must be to define and explain the duties that existing individuals and 
institutions have to protect the atmosphere for the sake of contemporaries and 
non-contemporaries. In this sense, there is much that the existing generation can 
do (and ought to do) as a matter of fair reciprocity to avoid dangerous climate 
change. Measures of mitigation could be adopted to increase energy efficiency in 
both the industrial and domestic sectors; transport practices could be altered; and 
more efficient land management practices could be adopted (Markandya and 
Halsnaes, 2001, pp. 474ff).  
Meanwhile, a range of adaptation measures could also be implemented that would 
modify human practices to accommodate climate changes that are no longer 
avoidable. Water security could be enhanced in many areas by improved flood 
defences; human health impacts could be minimized by improved public health 
infrastructure in communities vulnerable to extreme weather events; and the 
socio-economic infrastructure of vulnerable countries and regions could be 
protected by improved planning and the strategic relocation of industrial buildings 
away form coastal areas (McCarthy et al., 2001, pp. 9ff). In each case, the 
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motivating idea is that the present generation is bound by duties of fair reciprocity 
to ensure that our successors may also enjoy the benefit of a climate system that is 
hospitable for human life. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the stewardship approach to intergenerational justice requires further 
exploration and clarification, it is a clear addition to the family of ethical 
approaches that converge on requiring the preservation of environmental goods 
for the sake of future generations. Even if recognising duties of stewardship does 
not support any particular climate policy, it does further undermine the restrictive 
ethics that lie behind some climate sceptic positions. According to this restrictive 
ethics, the interests of future persons have no place in discussions of distributive 
and environmental justice because the unborn have no claims of justice, or the 
few claims they do have should be heavily discounted relative to those of existing 
persons (Schwartz, 1978; Beckerman and Pasek, 2001, pp. 11ff). The message of 
such ‘generocentrist’ arguments is that our concerns for posterity are best 
explored in terms of charity rather than entitlement (Heyd, 1992, pp. 80ff). 
Considerations of intergenerational stewardship, however, undermine this line of 
reasoning: each generation is required by justice to protect the climate system for 
their successors.   
Can we go beyond this cautious conclusion and posit any direct link between 
intergenerational stewardship and climate change policy? I would suggest that 
duties of stewardship strengthen the case for deep cuts in greenhouse emissions, 
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as well as financial transfers to aid climate adaptation, that go well beyond those 
included in the Kyoto Protocol. This is because stewardship provides the 
philosophical basis for a strict egalitarian conception of sustainable development 
according to which each generation is required ‘to conserve the diversity and 
quality of natural and cultural resources for present and future generations and to 
ensure equitable access to the use of these resources’ (Brown Weiss, 1992, p. 47; 
Arrow et al., 1996, p. 140). It is notable that proponents of climate policies that 
appeal to egalitarian conceptions of sustainability, such as the increasingly 
popular ‘Contraction and Convergence’10 proposal, have generally avoided the 
language of reciprocity. Other ethical principles, often concerned with the harms 
we inflict on the interests of future persons through our negligent environmental 
behaviour, have been pre-eminent. Yet, the duties of conservation defined by 
intergenerational stewardship fit well with climate policies that extend a principle 
of equal usage of the climate system to members of different nations and 
generations, and condemn as unjust policies, such as the ‘carbon intensity’ 
approach outlined earlier, that deny this principle.      
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1 A widely cited article by Naomi Oreskes reports that, of 928 articles published in peer 
reviewed scientific journals between 1993 and 2003 with abstracts containing the phrase 
‘global climate change’, none disputed the consensus position that the Earth’s climate has 
changed, and will continue to change, as a result of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect 
(Oreskes, 2004, p. 1686). 
2 Banuri et al., 1996, pp. 83ff; Arrow et al., 1996; Banuri and Weyant, 2001; Athanasiou 
and Baer, 2002, pp. 98ff; Jamieson, 2003, pp. 283ff; Shue, 2003. 
3 In the text, a person’s ‘well-being’ or ‘quality of life’ refers to how well that person’s 
life is going, for that person. Several theories of well-being are defended in the literature, 
the three most prominent focusing on the presence of pleasurable conscious states 
(hedonism), the fulfilment of desires (desire fulfilment theory), and the possession of 
goods that are of objective value (objective list theory). However, the discussion avoids 
endorsing any given theory of well-being, or the view, known as ‘welfarism’, that human 
well-being is the only thing of ultimate moral importance. 
4 Speech to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Silver Spring, 
Maryland, 14 February 2002. 
5 Former Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, for example, articulated this 
position forcefully at the 2002 UN climate change conference in Delhi. See BBC Online, 
‘India rejects climate change pressure’, Wednesday 30 October 2002 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2374551.stm). 
6 Observations from the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii show that atmospheric CO2 
concentrations reached 377 parts per million in 2004 and are currently growing at a rate 
of more than 2 parts per million per year. This figure compares with that of 316 parts per 
million in 1959 and 280 part per million in 1760, the date commonly used to mark the 
beginning of the industrial revolution (Keeling and Whorf, 2005). The Stern Review on 
the Economics of Climate Change note that even this figure gives a misleadingly low 
figure for overall greenhouse gas concentrations for it excludes the climate forcing role of 
Methane. Stern suggests that the current (2006) atmospheric concentration of the six 
major greenhouse gases combined (quoted in terms of the equivalent concentration in 
CO2) is roughly 430 parts per million (Stern, 2007, Chapter 1).   
7 Some have suggested that, while people do much cannot generally further or diminish 
the well-being of the dead, a certain degree of intergenerational reciprocity flows from 
the ability of later generations to further the posthumous reputations of their ancestors 
and/or fulfil the future-orientated projects that their ancestors commenced (see, for 
example, O’Neill, 1995, pp. 28ff). While this is without doubt an innovative approach to 
human well-being, appeals to posthumous benefit seem of limited application to the 
issues discussed in the text as both the quantity and quality of the intergenerational 
reciprocity created by such appeals is quite limited.   
8 Baier, 1981; Laslett, 1992; Brown Weiss, 1992, pp. 47ff; Ball, 2001, pp. 93ff. 
9 Rawls, 1971, pp. 111ff.  See also Hart, 1955, p.185; Nozick, 1974, p. 95; Simmons, 
1979, pp.103ff; Cullity, 1995, pp. 9ff. 
10 The contraction and convergence climate architecture has three main elements. First, 
each person on the planet is granted an equal right to emit carbon by virtue of their equal 
right to use the benefits provided by the atmospheric commons. Second, a ‘global ceiling’ 
for greenhouse gas emissions is set based on the amount the global environment can 
withstand without dangerous climate change taking place. Third, each country is allocated 
a yearly ‘carbon emissions budget’ consistent with the global ceiling not being exceeded. 
The name of the approach comes from the notion that, over time, it aims to bring about a 
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stabilisation, and later a contraction, in global greenhouse emissions so that they stay 
below a safe level; and that, in the longer term, all countries will converge on a roughly 
equal level of per-capita emissions (Meyer, 2000, pp. 56ff). 
 
  
